Heidegger's Cosmoview (08 December 2023; Heidegger)

    In this essay, I will argue that Heidegger’s Building, Dwelling, Thinking (BDT) sufficiently revives man’s place in the world in the wake of Descartes’ mechanistic account of the universe. First, I’ll introduce Heidegger’s philosophy as presented in BDT in depth, outlining each of its central concepts, culminating in an understanding of Being. For this first section, I’ll reference Heidegger’s BDT and Brague’s Wisdom of the World. Next, I’ll briefly recount Descartes’ rather mechanistic view of the world as presented in his Principles of Philosophy, focusing on how it alienated man from the external universe. Finally, I’ll explain how Descartes’ account cannot exist without the philosophy that Heidegger presents, thus sufficiently combatting the mechanistic notions Descartes presents.

In the wake of modernity, the philosophical world encountered a loss; the sense in which humans find themselves in the cosmos, where the cosmos itself has an influence on human life, no longer persists. As dogma faded and the scientific revolution proceeded, the vision of the world as nothing more than a material machine proceeded as we extracted ourselves from the world and looked at it as something to be measured in objective terms. This removal was described in Brague’s Wisdom of the World as he recounts one of Descartes’ works: “Descartes, perhaps without being aware of it, uses the expression ‘alone in the world’ at the moment when he nevertheless exhibits the most extreme doubt concerning the existence of external things: it is as if the world were the horizon of presence that is in fact assumed by all absence” (Wisdom 188-189). Additionally, without a cosmology to adhere to, the world loses its ability to give moral or ethical guidance to human life. Heidegger elects to approach this issue, to re-establish a connection between the cosmos and human life. Brague calls Heidegger’s approach a Weltanschauungen, or rather a specific “world view” (Wisdom 216). The Weltanschauungen can also be known by the Spanish word cosmoview, and represents (only) an aspect “of the process that reveals the world in its entirety as an image” (Wisdom 216) that takes up the reins following the death of cosmology. 

Heidegger’s core question of BDT concerns what it means to be; Being qua Being. An essential part of the answer to this question is dwelling. He addresses the question in two parts: first he asks, “What is it to dwell,” then, “How does building belong to dwelling?” (Building 347). He begins to uncover dwelling by positing that we “attain to dwelling, so it seems, only by means of building” (Building 347). In this relation, building is presented as a means to the end of dwelling; yet, not all building constitutes dwelling in the traditional sense (a light post, for example). By extension though, these buildings are means by which we can dwell in the world. This means-end relation presents us with a duality, that the two are somehow distinct from one another, a duality that Heidegger takes issue with. He claims that “to build is in itself already to dwell” (Building 348). This claim is backed by an etymological account of language, the mechanism which is the “master of man” (Building 348). Bauen, translated to building, is traceable to baun, to dwell (stay in a place). He’s also able to extract ich bin from buan, which means I dwell (Building 349); this represents the essence of our being on earth, what we constitutively do. Bauen, once traced back, not only reveals to us that we are because we dwell, but also that we can dwell so by cultivating. 

Cultivating enters Heidegger's language as a primary definition of building, seconded by the creation of buildings. These two meanings comprise buan’s true meaning, dwelling (Building 349). He summarizes his etymological inquiry into building by claiming three main points: “Building is really dwelling… Dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth… Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the building that erects buildings (Building 350). Building itself is not what makes us dwellers, but it is because we are dwellers that we build. Having established this threefold, Heidegger then elects to undertake an etymological journey into the meaning of dwelling itself. He eventually concludes that the essence of dwelling itself involves a certain sparing; we must be at peace and remain within a place, free from harm, a freedom which safeguards everything’s essence, “on the earth” (Building 351).

Heidegger's claim that dwelling necessarily involves mortals being on the earth leads him to introduce the fourfold. The fourfold consists of the earth, sky, mortals, and the divinities, which exist in an oneness with each other, each thing present at all times in things. The earth is the counterpart of the sky, and mortals are the counterpart of the divinities. Mortals exist in the fourfold by way of dwelling (Building 352); the way by which we can dwell in the fourfold is through our safeguarding of it. Heidegger outlines how we safeguard the fourfold: By saving the earth (cultivating it), receiving the sky (for we have no choice), awaiting the divinities, and by initiating our own essential being (practicing our capacity to die as we are mortals) (Building 352). While we preserve the fourfold, it is kept in things, that which we stay with (Building 353). Our cultivating, or building, brings the fourfold into things, thus preserving it, which is what enables us to dwell essentially. To stake the claim, “I dwell in this place,” is to conceal the true meaning of dwelling. We are always dwelling in the fourfold, as mortals, on the earth; but to truly dwell as such implies an intention to preserve this fourfold essence. For this, we must acknowledge the existence of the fourfold. We can do this by letting things be, allowing them to show their essences to us. To Be is to dwell, safeguarding of the fourfold; we are dwellers and we always dwell. 

In order to answer the question of how building belongs to dwelling, Heidegger uses the example of a bridge as a thing which gathers the fourfold. The bridge (and thus buildings) gathers the fourfold relationally; the banks of a stream only emerge as opposing banks once a bridge has set them apart from one another, cultivating the earth (Building 354). The bridge must also be ready to receive the sky and the floods it may bring. As pertains to mortals, the bridge allows us to initiate, crossing bridges to and fro, until eventually ending up at the final bridge (our death, the essence of mortality qua mortality). All of this occurs before the divinities which we await, whether we acknowledge them or not (Building 355). In a third etymological endeavor, Heidegger connects the term gathering to its ancient meaning, thing (a role taken on by the bridge in this instance). Things gather the fourfold. He claims that a bridge can never be a mere bridge and then a symbol of a bridge, and likewise, it most certainly cannot first be a symbol and then a bridge. It must primarily be a thing which gathers the fourfold, and that is how we should take it; it is not an object to have perceptible properties attached to, rather, we should not mistake it for anything other than a thing which gathers the fourfold. This is the essence which it reveals to us (Building 355). Thus, if the dwelling of humans involves safeguarding the fourfold, by building we have done exactly that; things exist as receptacles for the fourfold to exist which we may then preserve, which Heidegger argues constitutes our being in the world.

Heidegger then moves to introduce sites, locales, spaces, and places. The bridge, like other things, allows a site for the fourfold. For a site to exist though, there must first be something that can make space for it, which is called a locale. Locales only exist when a thing exists to delineate them; prior to the existence of a locale, there are merely spots (Building 356). The locales come to be because things come to be, through the process of building-constructing. Space, to Heidegger, is not like the mechanistic “grid” that Descartes proposes. Space exists only when there is a locale that precedes it; it is something, “that has been made room for, something that has been freed, namely, within a boundary… that from which something begins its essential unfolding” (Building 356). Locales create this space within their boundaries, and thus, space receives its essence from locales rather than from the colloquial (somewhat Cartesian) understanding of the word “space” (Building 356). The space which is allotted within a locale is the receptacle for the fourfold; this space, as pertains to the bridge, can be near or far to the observer. The space that lies between these positions can be measured; this “space that is thus made by positions in space” comes to be known as spatium (Building 357). This space is measured by the “intervals”; breadth, depth, and height. These dimensions are abstracted from space, and the three dimensions observed become extensio (extension). From this three-dimensional extension, one can then move to a purely mathematical space; from within the mathematical space, there are no locales. Spatium and extension which make mathematical space are only possible once locales and space exist prior to it; just because spatium and extension are “universally applicable,” does not mean they are the grounds of the essence of the preceding locales and spaces (Building 358). Heidegger here is not claiming that spatium and extensio are invalid, rather he is claiming that they are abstractions from the world, and cannot exist on their own as an interpretation of the world.

Having provided a detailed description of the relation between locale and space, Heidegger addresses the relation between man and space. Unlike the banks of the stream, man is not to be set apart from space. It is neither something external or internal to us, rather we relate to space in that we persist through it. Those things which we are not physically present to, we still stay with (in the sense of the fourfold) through space (Building 358). We can think of our immediate presence to the bridge, no matter our physical distance from it, going beyond a mere representation of it through mental imagery. Heidegger writes that to “say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locales” (Building 359). Spaces are thus inherently sustained by mortal life regardless of our physical position in the world. Alongside this idea of space, our concept of “here” is obscured by the fact that we are never “here,” rather, we are pervading a certain space (Building 359). The relation we have to locales, and the relation of locales to spaces, and thus our relation to spaces is interwoven into what it means to dwell; dwelling properly can be thought of as the relation between man and space (Building 359). 

In the conclusion of his essay, Heidegger defines the relation of dwelling to Being in a singular sentence: “Dwelling… is the basic character of Being, in keeping with which mortals exist” (Building 362). Having made it this far in his writing, he chooses to address thinking, which he believes to be inseparable from dwelling, alongside building. The issue associated with dwelling, perceived to be the housing shortage, go beyond the issue of the mere inability to provide enough houses for the number of people in Germany: Rather, it is the lack of thought which leads to lack of dwelling. Heidegger argues it is thinking which “is the sole summons which calls mortals into their dwelling,” and this summons can be answered by building for the sake of dwelling (Building 363). Through thinking and building, one can properly dwell, and by properly dwelling, we understand our being-in-the-world.

Severing the cosmological tradition which preceded it, Descartes’ philosophy as presented in his meditations presents the universe as a machine set into motion by God. All philosophical knowledge stems from the premise, “I am thinking, therefore I exist” (Principles 7); because his existence is constituted merely by his thinking, he claims that he is a “thinking thing,” opening a hierarchy of mind and body dualism that he propagates throughout his philosophy. In opening this dualism, the “I” becomes an internal thing, and the world becomes something outside of us that is not us. Things of the outside world become apparent to us through the application of what is perceptible, namely length, breadth and depth; the corporeal world doesn’t consist of any sensed things, such as color, hardness, or smell, but merely as extension (Principles 42). To Descartes, space describes the measure of length, breadth, and depth in an area (Principles 46). Because we are separate from the world and the mind does not require body to operate, there’s nothing outside of us that we should draw from for moral guidance; the cosmos thus lacks an inherent moral component. 

By establishing a proper method of how to properly dwell in the world, Heidegger reintroduces an ethical component to the cosmos, bridging the gap severed by Descartes and modernism. While not with the same strength and veracity as presented in the Timaeus’ cosmology, Heidegger nonetheless presents a compelling cosmoview. In countering Descartes, Heidegger first counters the separation from the world that Descartes’ “I” faces. Heidegger believes that Descartes’ abstraction is only possible once Being is properly understood, and that Descartes’ abstraction is precisely that; an abstraction. To be an abstraction, Descartes must be abstracting from something, which Heidegger believes is the cosmos. In the worldview Descartes presents, he is alienated from the world due to the hierarchy between him and corporeal things; Heidegger’s baseline is the communion between man and cosmos, that by being-in-the-world, Descartes’ described alienation is impossible

For Heidegger, there’s no separation from the mind and the corporeal world. Descartes’ assertion must chronologically follow the existence of locales, which enable measurable space. The way pure mathematics is reached is only through the measurable world, once space is gauged from a locale. Heidegger writes, “in the course of Western thought… the thing is represented as an unknown X to which perceptible properties are attached. From this point of view, everything that already belongs to the essence of this thing does, of course, appear as something that is afterward read into it” (Building 355). While Descartes believes that we assign essences to things through perception, in addition to the perceptible qualities, Heidegger thinks that the order is reversed; things reveal their essences to us, and in order to see these essences, we musn’t interfere by assigning essence as Descartes does. 

Having bridged the gap between the outside world and man through the connection of locale and space as necessary for Descartes’ abstraction to occur, the bridge between man and cosmos is rebuilt. As dwellers, it is our duty to “build out of dwelling” (Building 363), for in doing so we safeguard the fourfold; the ethical obligation we’re given is to cultivate the earth, receive the sky, await the divinities, and initiate our own mortality. We must do these things to properly dwell, the fundamental substratum of Being. 

Works Cited

Brague, Rémi. The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience of the Universe in Western Thought. University of Chicago Press, 2020. 

Heidegger, Martin, and Albert Hofstadter. Poetry, Language, Thought. Harper & Row, 1975. 

Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press, 1985.