Gorbachev: The Empire Killer (07 June 2024; Edele)

     The exact milieu in which the Soviet Union began its terminal spiral is subject to debate. In this essay, I will argue that the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union began with Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. I’ll defend my argument in two main parts of this paper: First, I’ll provide background information, describing the Soviet Union that Gorbachev inherited. Then, I’ll present and explicate which policies and ideological reforms Gorbachev precipitated that ensured the demise of the Soviet Union. Finally, I’ll address counter-arguments to my claim that support other milieus as the beginning of the end of the Union, particularly the era of Stalinism and the period under Brezhnev in the mid-1970s.

    In 1985, Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party leading the Soviet Union. The Union Gorbachev was left was much like the Union his predecessors led; it was a society of shortages and suppressed dissent, but it was stable. Brezhnev successfully quelled the Union-deteriorating effects of the expansion in free speech seen with Kruschev’s partial liberation, decreasing the number of violent uprisings that occurred under Kruschev by roughly 73%. His incorrect assumption that the welfare state could be expanded bilaterally with the armed forces to reach nuclear parity with the West led to the enshrinement of self-provisioning in law. Self-provisioning was a response to the major hit the consumer sector took as the attempted expansion of both consumer and defense spending created a financial vacuum. Despite the shortages and associated economic blow, this self-provisioning led many of those who lived through the Brezhnev era to look back upon it with fondness, as the “Soviet society had found some kind of steady state after decades of upheaval and suffering.” The Union, in its stagnant yet stable state, had “seemed like it was here to stay… it was ‘forever’ – until it suddenly ‘was no more.’”

Following Brezhnev’s passing, two other geriatric party elites rose to power for very brief periods of time before their own passing: Andropov from 1982 until his death in 1984, and Chernenko for just a few months beginning in 1984 before his passing in 1985. The Soviet Union was ready for young(er) blood: “This moment came in 1985 with the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev… the gravedigger of the Soviet Empire”. The Union was composed of 15 republics, each “enmeshed in complex ties of mutual economic dependencies,” and with historical national identities. This system of mutual dependency made it such that no republic could viably function independently within the Union. These communist republics united under the Soviet Union adhered to a centralized economic plan, whose function was to moderate exchange. In 1985, “there was widespread compliance with [this] system that had successfully integrated rulers and ruled in an often unhappy and gray but stable existence.” The end of the Union, then, would not ignite from below, but rather would be yet another revolution from above: “it was the Communist establishment… which was primarily responsible for the downfall of the Soviet Empire.” This downfall would begin in the Soviet economic system.

The centrally planned economy was inherently an economy of shortages. It was the antithesis of a free market; markets could not fall into their natural equilibrium in the Soviet system. Rather than be dictated by the natural sway of market relations, the Union depended upon “a complex bureaucratic system of target setting, target adjustment, and target fulfillment.” The economy was designed as such to mitigate chaos, but presented problems. Planners “could only know some of the needs of consumers,” and because the Soviet Union was always authoritative and dictatorial, it did not feel a pressing obligation to heed to the needs of the people. Instead, economic planners felt pressure from their fellows in the Kremlin, particularly military generals, leading to neglect of the consumer economy in favor of defense spending. The inherent flaws of the centralized economic system, alongside the state’s turbulent history (first revolution, WW2, Stalin), resulted in a population that “remained poor by international standards.”

Gorbachev sought to drastically change the long-standing unproductive and famished economy. Unfortunately for the Union, he miscalculated the destructive impact his policy changes would have. Gorbachev used the term “perestroika” (restructuring) to describe the changes he planned to make; the Union required radical change, which he deemed to be a “revolutionary task,” further signaling his aim at a revolution from above. In short, perestroika would eventually legalize cooperatives and further encourage semi-private enterprise. In doing so, it would demonopolize the centralized economy and partially free price controls. 

Before the official legislation of these radical changes to the Soviet economy, Gorbachev seized the opportunity to disturb an even longer-standing totem of the region; alcohol. While not explicit prohibition as was seen in the United States, Gorbachev implemented legislation that would drastically decrease the production and distribution of alcohol. The anti-alcohol campaign was aimed at reducing the prevalence of alcohol abuse. Rather than succeed at this initiative, the measure served to do two main things: First, alcohol was a tremendous source of state revenue; the state collected 25.4bn rubles in alcohol sales taxes in 1979 alone. In 1979, 25.4bn rubles was more than what the state collected from each of its republics in income tax. The “destruction of the alcohol industry canceled one of the state’s most potent ways to extract surplus money from the population, and hence control inflation,” contributing to the economic and social instability in the Union. Second, it didn’t really succeed in its intention. Alcohol is a difficult drug to quit cold-turkey; many alcoholics, whom the legislation was targeting in the first place, resorted to “moonshine, industrial alcohol, typewriter cleaning fluid, or eau de cologne.”

With oil prices falling, the anti-alcohol campaign leading to severe shortages, Gorbachev elected to further the implementation of perestroika. The 1987 enterprise law and the 1988 law in favor of cooperatives would lead to the  destruction of the central economy while only partially liberating the market, creating a sort of price-control vacuum. The Union’s economy was stuck; the free market can only work when it is free, and with the destruction of the central economy, the sort of in-between state the Union was in could not work. The reforms led to a deepening of the economic crisis: “The economic system, not fully marketized but no longer centrally controlled, collapsed.” The working class began to feel the pressure of the collapse; with the other main ideological term used by Gorbachev, “glasnost,” or, “openness” beginning its implementation, workers were more free to show their dissent and anxiety caused by the changes in the economic system and thus, unrest began to boil, in some instances leading to protests.

Glasnost was just as well-intentioned as perestroika, but was equally destructive to the Soviet Union. Glasnost pushed democracy and freedom of speech in a state whose existence had always depended upon dictatorial rule and censorship. These policies, rather than strengthen the Union by heading for the more democratic future Lenin envisioned, allowed nations that were swallowed by the Soviet Union to begin to vie for their independence. Gorbachev believed that the state was ready for democracy, that communism could move past its initial requirement for dictatorial leadership, another grave miscalculation on his part. The reforms he had implemented in 1987 and 1988, alongside the anti-alcohol campaign, led to doubts not only from the people but also from within the Party. The extent to which the Union was willing to ideologically manifest glasnost was tested by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; the suppression of information that followed, as well as the complete lack of communication on Gorbachev’s end in the three weeks following the explosion only served to further distrust in Soviet leadership. 

Resistance from inside the Party, coupled with distrust and increased nationalist attitudes from the Soviet republics made the outlook of the Union’s survival quite glum. Gorbachev could not implement both democratic self-governance among the Soviet republics and preserve the integrity of the Union. In 1989, in an attempt to restore popular support from both within the party and from the people (now free to express their opinions under glasnost), he introduced the Congress of People’s Deputies. It was designed such that only ⅓ of its seats were reserved for the Communist party, and the rest could be freely challenged. The move backfired, further compromising the integrity of the Union: “democratization began to undermine the very political structure [Gorbachev’s] power was based on.” The force which strong-armed political unity could no longer be maintained, and the tyrannical communist political monopoly could now be freely challenged, both by the public in literary protest and in the Congress of People’s Deputies. 

Gorbachev effectively ended the Cold War with the west in an effort to cut back on defense spending and invest further into consumer resources, but it was too late. The economic reforms and democratization associated with glasnost served as the straw that broke the camel’s back. The perimeter of the Soviet Union began to falter, its republics garnering increasingly nationalist support. While not all peaceful and without casualty, the Soviet republics began to gain their independence from the Soviet Union, a chain reaction beginning in 1989, and ending in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. The Union had been put together by force, not by respect or willingness of the people. The Soviet’s had less than a quarter of the popular vote in 1918; their rule was ensured only by fear, not desire to adhere. 

Other scholars may argue that Stalin’s reign of terror from 1924 to 1953 was the beginning of the end of the Union, and others may argue it was Brezhnev’s gross overspending on defense and neglect of consumer goods in the mid-70s, driving economic issues and shortages. Both arguments hold some validity; Edele, who ultimately argues that the beginning of the end of the Union was ensured by Gorbachev, acknowledges that Gorbachev was leading a Union that survived the “dark years of Stalinism, which continued to hang above them like a shadow.” The immense loss of life of productive party members, the intelligentsia, and workers alike, can be likened to the burning of the Library of Alexandria, as far as disruption of future progress is concerned. The economic and social damage Stalin caused was incalculable. It can be argued that the post-Stalin years were aimed at doing damage control from that which was caused by Stalin and WWII. Yet, I argue that damage control does not guarantee demise. Yes, if Trotsky took power rather than Stalin, things would likely have been much different for the future of Soviet society, such that it may exist even today. But damage control and economic stagnation ≠ guaranteed demise of the empire. Brezhnev’s handiwork created a society of great shortages; a promising argument for this time as the beginning of the end is that Gorbachev’s policies were somewhat reactionary to the state the economy was in when he rose to power. If Brezhnev had not tried to increase both consumer spending and defense spending bilaterally with money the Union didn’t have, eventually leaning towards defense spending, then Gorbachev may not have felt the pressure to dismantle the central economy. Here, it is still Gorbachev’s actions which are the ultimate catalyst for the demise of the Union. His ideological reforms were more than the Union could handle during his secretaryship.  

Gorbachev inherited a relatively stable Soviet Union. It was his well-intentioned but misguided actions which ensured a relatively painless death for the Union. Beginning with his economic reforms, the economy with which the country had functioned, albeit poorly but still functionally, collapsed. Gorbachev was not forced to make this move; yes, oil prices were falling, but these reforms were not only tactical but also ideological and poorly timed. The path he chose was not the only path available to him, and was influenced by his desire to reach for a stage of communism the Union was healthy enough for. To make matters worse, equally as detrimental to the integrity of the Union was the democratization and freeing of speech. Gorbachev led the Soviet Union to grave shortages and destroyed the infrastructure of alcohol. The people had always been held in check by the historically authoritative nature of the Union. Glasnost allowed people to express their growing dissent; things were getting worse, and they knew that life was better in the west, and they expressed it. Perestroika and glasnost together served to implode the Union, passing a point of no return in 1989 as nationalist tendencies exploded. There is no guarantee that the Union would have survived for a longer or shorter amount of time had Gorbachev acted differently; it is his actions, however, which can be directly linked to the disturbance of the mechanisms and ideals which had held the Union together for nearly 70 years, leading to its demise.

Bibliography

Edele, Mark. The Soviet Union: A Short History. Hoboken, NJ: WILEY Blackwell, 2019. 

Jones, Ryan. “The Bolsheviks Take Power.” 347.4. Lecture, 2024.

“Perestroika and Glasnost.” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, October 5, 2015. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/perestroika-and-glasnost/.